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Eﬀ ects of minimum unit pricing for alcohol on diﬀ erent 
income and socioeconomic groups: a modelling study
John Holmes, Yang Meng, Petra S Meier, Alan Brennan, Colin Angus, Alexia Campbell-Burton, Yelan Guo, Daniel Hill-McManus, Robin C Purshouse
Summary
Background Several countries are considering a minimum price policy for alcohol, but concerns exist about the 
potential eﬀ ects on drinkers with low incomes. We aimed to assess the eﬀ ect of a £0·45 minimum unit price (1 unit 
is 8 g/10 mL ethanol) in England across the income and socioeconomic distributions.
Methods We used the Sheﬃ  eld Alcohol Policy Model (SAPM) version 2.6, a causal, deterministic, epidemiological 
model, to assess eﬀ ects of a minimum unit price policy. SAPM accounts for alcohol purchasing and consumption 
preferences for population subgroups including income and socioeconomic groups. Purchasing preferences are 
regarded as the types and volumes of alcohol beverages, prices paid, and the balance between on-trade (eg, bars) and 
oﬀ -trade (eg, shops). We estimated price elasticities from 9 years of survey data and did sensitivity analyses with 
alternative elasticities. We assessed eﬀ ects of the policy on moderate, hazardous, and harmful drinkers, split into 
three socioeconomic groups (living in routine or manual households, intermediate households, and managerial or 
professional households). We examined policy eﬀ ects on alcohol consumption, spending, rates of alcohol-related 
health harm, and opportunity costs associated with that harm. Rates of harm and costs were estimated for a 10 year 
period after policy implementation. We adjusted baseline rates of mortality and morbidity to account for diﬀ erential 
risk between socioeconomic groups.
Findings Overall, a minimum unit price of £0·45 led to an immediate reduction in consumption of 1·6% (–11·7 units 
per drinker per year) in our model. Moderate drinkers were least aﬀ ected in terms of consumption (−3·8 units per 
drinker per year for the lowest income quintile vs 0·8 units increase for the highest income quintile) and spending 
(increase in spending of £0·04 vs £1·86 per year). The greatest behavioural changes occurred in harmful drinkers 
(change in consumption of –3·7% or –138·2 units per drinker per year, with a decrease in spending of £4·01), 
especially in the lowest income quintile (–7·6% or −299·8 units per drinker per year, with a decrease in spending of 
£34·63) compared with the highest income quintile (–1·0% or −34·3 units, with an increase in spending of £16·35). 
Estimated health beneﬁ ts from the policy were also unequally distributed. Individuals in the lowest socioeconomic 
group (living in routine or manual worker households and comprising 41·7% of the sample population) would accrue 
81·8% of reductions in premature deaths and 87·1% of gains in terms of quality-adjusted life-years.
Interpretation Irrespective of income, moderate drinkers were little aﬀ ected by a minimum unit price of £0·45 in our 
model, with the greatest eﬀ ects noted for harmful drinkers. Because harmful drinkers on low incomes purchase 
more alcohol at less than the minimum unit price threshold compared with other groups, they would be aﬀ ected 
most by this policy. Large reductions in consumption in this group would however coincide with substantial health 
gains in terms of morbidity and mortality related to reduced alcohol consumption.
Funding UK Medical Research Council and Economic and Social Research Council (grant G1000043).
Copyright © Holmes et al. Open Access article distributed under the terms of CC BY.
Introduction
Minimum pricing policies for alcohol are under 
consideration in several countries.1–3 Most notably, the 
Scottish Government has passed, but not yet 
implemented, legislation to introduce a minimum price 
below which a unit (8 g/10 mL) of pure alcohol cannot be 
sold to consumers. The UK Government recently 
withdrew its commitment to introduce the same policy 
in England and Wales, citing concerns about a lack of 
evidence of eﬀ ectiveness and the potential eﬀ ect on 
responsible drinkers.4 Concerns around the possibility of 
large eﬀ ects on individuals with low incomes have also 
been a prominent feature of the policy debate in both 
countries.5,6 In this report, we aimed to investigate these 
concerns via a new appraisal of the potential eﬀ ect of 
minimum unit pricing across consumption, income, 
and socioeconomic distributions.
Assessments of implemented minimum price changes 
for alcohol in Canada have suggested that a minimum 
unit price would reduce prevalence of deaths and hospital 
admissions related to alcohol.7,8 These conclusions are 
supported by meta-analyses that show consistent negative 
associations between alcohol price changes and rates of 
alcohol consumption and harms including alcohol-related 
mortality.9,10 Previously published UK policy appraisals 
based on the Sheﬃ  eld Alcohol Policy Model (SAPM), also 
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suggest that a minimum unit price would have greater 
eﬀ ects on heavy drinkers than on moderate drinkers.11
A limitation of this evidence is that it does not address 
whether a minimum unit price has regressive eﬀ ects by 
imposing the greatest burden on the poorest groups. 
Studies examining this question have concluded that 
regressive eﬀ ects would, at worst, be small.12,13 However, 
these equity assessments were unbalanced because they 
focused only on alcohol consumption and spending 
changes but not eﬀ ects on health outcomes. This 
omission is especially important because the lowest 
socioeconomic groups have the highest risks of alcohol-
related harm,14 and might accrue the greatest health 
beneﬁ ts from the policy. These beneﬁ cial eﬀ ects should 
be considered alongside spending and consumption 
changes in any equity judgment.
Methods
Study design and data sources
In the SAPM version 2.6, we present policy appraisals for 
a £0·45 minimum unit price in England in 2014–15, 
which was previously proposed as the implementation 
date of the UK Government’s policy. We examine the 
potential policy eﬀ ects in two ways: ﬁ rst, by deﬁ nition of 
ﬁ ve population subgroups based on household income 
quintiles and, second, by deﬁ nition of three 
socioeconomic subgroups based on occupation type. 
Both analyses estimate policy eﬀ ects on alcohol 
consumption and spending and the second also estimates 
eﬀ ects on morbidity and mortality related to alcohol 
consumption. The appendix and technical report contain 
full methodological details for SAPM version 2.6.15
The 2009 General Lifestyle Survey (GLF) provides data 
for alcohol consumption in adults older than 16 years in 
England, including details for the mean weekly number 
of units consumed and highest daily alcohol intake in the 
survey week for 10 588 respondents.16 Consumption data 
are split by beverage type (beers, cider, wines, spirits, and 
ready-to-drink beverages [RTDs]). Sampling weights in 
the GLF dataset were used to adjust for sampling bias and 
to scale the data to the English population.16 We classify 
drinkers into three groups: moderate drinkers (≤21 units 
per week for men and ≤14 units per week for women), 
hazardous drinkers (>21–50 units per week for men and 
>14–35 units per week for women), and harmful drinkers 
(>50 units per week for men and >35 units per week for 
women). Notably, the GLF contains no information on 
prices paid or purchase location.
The annual UK Living Costs and Food Survey (LCF) 
uses 14 day diaries to record purchases of products by 
household members older than 16 years.17 Transaction-
level data for 2001–02 to 2009 cover 227 933 alcohol 
transactions by 46 185 individuals. Data for each alcohol 
purchase includes beverage type, price paid, volume 
bought, and purchase location (on-trade [eg, in bars or 
restaurants] vs oﬀ -trade [eg, in shops]). We adjusted the 
LCF data to 2011 prices by use of retail price indices 
speciﬁ c to alcohol that are available from the Oﬃ  ce for 
National Statistics (ONS).15 Sampling weights provided 
within the LCF dataset were used to correct for sampling 
bias.17 We adjusted sales volumes at diﬀ erent price points 
for ten beverage types (on-trade and oﬀ -trade beer, cider, 
wine, spirits, and RTDs) to match aggregated England 
and Wales 2011 sales data purchased from AC Nielsen for 
oﬀ -trade sales and CGA Strategy for on-trade sales. For all 
policy appraisals, we accounted for inﬂ ation by adjusting 
the £0·45 minimum unit price threshold to 2011 prices 
separately for each beverage.15
We deﬁ ne 54 population subgroups in each dataset on 
the basis of age, sex, and alcohol consumption level. For 
our analyses, subgroups are further split by income 
quintile or nine socioeconomic groups. We linked the GLF 
and LCF data at subgroup level by assuming that patterns 
of on-trade and oﬀ -trade purchasing in the LCF can be 
Oﬀ -trade 
beer 
purchase
Oﬀ -trade 
cider 
purchase
Oﬀ -trade 
wine 
purchase
Oﬀ -trade 
spirits 
purchase
Oﬀ -trade 
RTDs 
purchase
On-trade 
beer 
purchase
On-trade 
cider 
purchase
On-trade 
wine 
purchase
On-trade 
spirits 
purchase
On-trade 
RTDs 
purchase
Oﬀ -trade beer price −0·980%* −0·189% 0·096% −0·368% −1·092% −0·016% −0·050% 0·253% 0·030% 0·503%
Oﬀ -trade cider price 0·065% −1·268%* 0·118% −0·122% −0·239% −0·053% 0·093% 0·067% −0·108% −0·194%
Oﬀ -trade wine price −0·040% 0·736%* −0·384%* 0·363% 0·039% −0·245% −0·155% 0·043% −0·186% 0·110%
Oﬀ -trade spirits price 0·113% −0·024% 0·163% −0·082% −0·042% 0·167% 0·406% 0·005% 0·084% 0·233%
Oﬀ -trade RTDs price −0·047% −0·159% −0·006% 0·079% −0·585%* −0·061% 0·067% 0·068% −0·179%* 0·093%
On-trade beer price 0·148% −0·285% 0·115% −0·028% 0·803% −0·786%* 0·867% 1·042%* 1·169%* −0·117%
On-trade cider price −0·100% 0·071% 0·043% 0·021% 0·365% 0·035% −0·591%* 0·072% 0·237%* 0·241%
On-trade wine price −0·197% 0·094% −0·154% −0·031% −0·093% −0·276% −0·031% −0·871%* −0·021% −0·363%
On-trade spirits price 0·019% −0·117% −0·027% −0·280% −0·145% −0·002% −0·284% 0·109% −0·890%* 0·809%*
On-trade RTDs price 0·079% 0·005% −0·085% −0·047% 0·369% 0·121% −0·394% −0·027% −0·071% −0·187%
Cells shows the estimated percentage reduction in quantity purchased that would occur for the column beverage after a 1% increase in price for the row beverage (eg, a 1% 
increase in oﬀ -trade beer prices would lead to a 0·980% decline in oﬀ -trade beer purchasing, a 0·19% decline in oﬀ -trade cider purchasing and so on). Own price elasticities are 
shown in bold. RTD=ready-to-drink beverages or alcopops. *p≤0·05 (exact p values are shown in the appendix). Oﬀ -trade beverages are beverages purchased in oﬀ -trade outlets 
(eg, shops) and on-trade beverages are beverages purchased in on-trade outlets (eg, bars and restaurants). 
Table 1: Own and cross-price elasticities of demand for ten beverage categories
See Online for appendix
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used to apportion individuals’ mean weekly consumption 
in the GLF into the ten beverage types. Because individuals 
could be purchasing alcohol for other people, sensitivity 
analyses around this linkage are provided in the appendix.
Modelling
We used price elasticities for alcohol demand as key inputs 
to SAPM to model how consumption of a product changes 
after a price change. For example, a price elasticity of 
−0·5 suggests that a 1% price increase is associated with a 
0·5% decline in consumption. Previous SAPM appraisals 
used elasticities from cross-sectional analyses of LCF data 
or from other sources;11 however, in SAPM version 2.6, 
they were derived from a longitudinal analysis.18 Ideal 
individual-level longitudinal panel data for changes in 
purchasing and prices paid do not exist. However, we 
developed a pseudo-panel approach by use of repeat cross-
sectional LCF 2001–02 to 2009 data. This method deﬁ nes 
the same 72 subgroups in each survey year by use of 
characteristics that are largely stable over time (ie, birth 
year, sex, and socioeconomic status) and then explicitly 
analyses the longitudinal time trends in each subgroup for 
mean weekly purchasing levels and prices paid with a 
ﬁ xed-eﬀ ects model.18 This approach has been applied 
Overall Quintile 1 
(lowest income)
Quintile 2 Quintile 3 Quintile 4 Quintile 5 
(highest income)
Sample size 10 588 2130 2335 2121 1980 2022
All drinkers
n (%)* 8953 (84%) 1566 (72%) 1858 (78%) 1832 (87%) 1813 (91%) 1884 (93%)
Baseline consumption (units per week) 14·1 12·7 12·2 13·6 13·9 17·5
Weekly units purchased at <£0·45 3·3 4·0 3·2 3·2 2·8 2·5
Percentage of total units purchased at <£0·45 23·2% 31·7% 26·2% 23·2% 19·9% 14·4%
Baseline spending (£ per year) £633 £492 £505 £620 £647 £849
Change in consumption (%) −1·6% −4·4% −2·4% −1·7% −0·8% −0·1%
Change in consumption (yearly units per drinker) −11·7 −29·3 −15·1 −12·4 −5·5 −0·8
Change in spending (£ per drinker per year) £2·12 –£1·89 £0·11 £1·84 £3·22 £6·10
Moderate drinkers
n (%)* 6545 (62%) 1235 (57%) 1432 (60%) 1389 (66%) 1299 (66%) 1190 (60%)
Baseline consumption (units per week) 5·5 4·6 4·5 5·5 5·8 6·8
Weekly units purchased at <£0·45 0·7 0·8 0·7 0·6 0·5 0·4
Percentage of total units purchased at <£0·45 12·5% 18·4% 15·8% 11·6% 8·4% 5·5%
Baseline spending (£ per year) £286 £202 £207 £283 £317 £412
Change in consumption (%) −0·6% −1·6% −1·2% −0·5% −0·3% 0·2%
Change in consumption (yearly units per drinker) −1·6 −3·8 −2·8 −1·6 −0·8 0·8
Change in spending (£ per drinker per year) £0·78 £0·04 £0·34 £0·79 £0·85 £1·86
Hazardous drinkers
n (%)* 1851 (18%) 227 (11%) 337 (15%) 346 (16%) 405 (20%) 536 (26%)
Baseline consumption (units per week) 27·2 26·9 26·7 26·9 27·6 27·5
Weekly units purchased at <£0·45 5·3 7·9 6·0 5·3 4·0 2·7
Percentage of total units purchased at <£0·45 19·5% 29·2% 22·6% 19·7% 14·4% 9·8%
Baseline spending (£ per year) £1180 £1019 £1076 £1146 £1219 £1298
Change in consumption (%) −0·6% −3·0% −1·8% −0·7% 0·1% 0·4%
Change in consumption (yearly units per drinker) −9·1 −41·7 −24·8 −9·5 1·7 5·4
Change in spending (£ per drinker per year) £8·67 £2·60 £1·56 £6·80 £13·19 £12·89
Harmful drinkers
n (%)* 557 (5%) 104 (5%) 89 (4%) 97 (5%) 109 (5%) 158 (8%)
Baseline consumption (units per week) 71·4 75·9 74·4 76·8 65·5 67·1
Weekly units purchased at <£0·45 21·8 30·8 25·2 23·8 18·4 13·6
Percentage of total units purchased at <£0·45 30·5% 40·6% 33·9% 31·0% 28·1% 20·3%
Baseline spending (£ per year) £2862 £2685 £2892 £3317 £2709 £2751
Change in consumption (%) −3·7% −7·6% −4·3% −4·0% −2·8% −1·0%
Change in consumption (yearly units per drinker) −138·2 −299·8 −165·0 −160·3 −97·1 −34·3
Change in spending (£ per drinker per year) –£4·01 –£34·63 –£8·67 –£0·11 –£6·08 £16·35
*Numbers refer to absolute sample size, percentages refer to the sample size after survey weights have been applied.
Table 2: Baseline and estimated change in alcohol consumption and spending with a £0·45 minimum unit price, by income and consumption group
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previously to estimate demand elasticities for various 
goods,19 but not for alcohol until now.
We did separate analyses for the ten beverage types to 
derive a single population-level 10×10 matrix containing 
both signiﬁ cant and non-signiﬁ cant own-price and 
cross-price elasticities. In SAPM, own-price elasticities 
describe the association between price and consumption 
for one beverage type whereas cross-price elasticities 
describe the association between price of one beverage 
type and consumption for another (table 1). Overall, the 
new pseudo-panel analysis results in a signiﬁ cant overall 
elasticity estimate that is similar to that derived from 
SAPM’s previous elasticity approach and from meta-
analyses.10,15,18 Cross-price elasticities in our study were 
larger than were those reported from cross-sectional 
analysis of the LCF, although smaller than those reported 
in UK time series analyses.20 We also report sensitivity 
analyses that used alternative elasticities, including only 
own-price elasticities and only signiﬁ cant own-price or 
cross-price elasticities. Additional sensitivity analyses 
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with subgroup-speciﬁ c elasticities are presented alongside 
all elasticity matrices in the appendix.
To model the eﬀ ect of a minimum unit price, we made 
a conservative assumption that retailers would increase 
prices only to the minimum threshold and prices above 
the threshold would be unaﬀ ected. We then estimated 
eﬀ ects on mean weekly alcohol consumption by 
combining these implied price changes with the elasticity 
matrices. This process takes the 2009 GLF population as 
its baseline and simulates a future GLF sample, in 
particular estimating a revised average and highest daily 
consumption for each individual. Because the LCF does 
not divide spending data into individual drinking 
occasions, we indirectly modelled eﬀ ects on highest daily 
consumption by use of a least-squares linear regression 
model for each of the three consumption groups, with 
highest daily consumption estimated as a function of 
mean consumption, age, and sex.
We modelled the eﬀ ect of consumption changes on 
mortality and disease prevalence for 47 chronic and 
acute conditions attributable wholly or partly to alcohol.15 
For chronic conditions that are partly attributable to 
alcohol consumption (eg, alcohol-related cancers), we 
used functions relating average consumption to health 
risk as reported elsewhere.15 For acute conditions that 
are partly attributable to alcohol consumption (eg, road 
traﬃ  c accidents), we ﬁ tted linear functions relating 
highest daily consumption to evidence of the alcohol-
attributable fraction for the condition.21 For chronic 
conditions (eg, alcoholic liver disease) and acute 
conditions (eg, alcohol poisoning) that are wholly 
attributable to alcohol consumption, we ﬁ tted functions 
relating either average or maximum daily consumption 
to the absolute number of cases reported.21 We obtained 
absolute numbers for baseline condition-speciﬁ c 
mortality and morbidity by age and sex subgroups from 
2005–06 ONS and Hospital Episodes Statistics data 
compiled by Jones and colleagues.22 We used change in 
consumption, and thus risk, over time to adjust observed 
mortality and morbidity rates by applying the potential 
impact fraction method.23 For chronic conditions, a lack 
of evidence exists regarding the time lag between 
population-level changes in drinking and associated 
changes in health harms. We use a linear time lag 
function of 10 years building up to the full eﬀ ect, which 
is consistent with average estimates used elsewhere.24
Model parameters adjustment
This report contains two separate analyses. For the ﬁ rst 
analysis, we split the population into income quintiles 
based on respondents’ household income, adjusted with 
the McClement’s equivalisation scale to account for 
diﬀ erences in disposable income because of household 
composition.25
In the second analysis, we deﬁ ned subgroups according 
to the National Statistics Socioeconomic Classiﬁ cation 
(NS-SEC). Each individual was assigned to one of nine 
NS-SEC categories or to a missing data category. To 
estimate baseline mortality risk for each condition by NS-
SEC subgroup, we adjusted the population averages from 
Jones and colleagues22 with the latest available ONS data 
for overall incidence of mortality related to alcohol 
consumption by socioeconomic group.26 Equivalent 
adjustment data for hospital admissions related to alcohol 
consumption are not available, so we assumed that the 
mortality socioeconomic adjustments also apply to 
morbidity. ONS adjustment data were not available for 
individuals in “never worked and long-term unemployed” 
and “missing” subgroups. Therefore, we assigned the 
baseline mortality risk of NS-SEC Group 7 (the next lowest 
group) to both subgroups, and report sensitivity analyses 
around this assumption (appendix). For clarity, when 
reporting results, we collapse groups into a three-category 
NS-SEC classiﬁ cation (managerial or professional, 
intermediate, and routine or manual occupations). 
Individuals who have never worked, are long-term 
unemployed, or missing data categories are included in 
the routine or manual worker group.
We also did sensitivity analyses to examine the eﬀ ect of 
application of alternative minimum unit price thresholds 
and account for under-reporting of alcohol consumption 
in the GLF survey (appendix).
Role of the funding source
The sponsor of the study had no role in study design, 
data collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or 
writing of the report. The corresponding author had full 
access to all the data in the study and had ﬁ nal 
responsibility for the decision to submit for publication.
Routine or 
manual
Intermediate Managerial or 
professional
Drinkers
n (%)* 3505 (79%) 1491 (83%) 3957 (90%)
Baseline consumption (units per week) 13·3 13·5 15·1
Change in consumption (%) –3·2% –1·2% –0·5%
Moderate drinkers
n (%)* 2678 (60%) 1093 (61%) 2774 (64%)
Baseline consumption (units per week) 4·9 5·1 6·2
Change in consumption (%) –1·2% –0·6% 0·0%
Hazardous drinkers
n (%)* 622 (14%) 314 (17%) 915 (21%)
Baseline consumption (units per week) 27·1 27·0 27·3
Change in consumption (%) –1·8% –0·8% 0·2%
Harmful drinkers
n (%)* 205 (5%) 84 (5%) 268 (6%)
Baseline consumption (units per week) 75·7 71·3 67·8
Change in consumption (%) –6·3% –2·5% –1·7%
Data for 10588 survey respondents. *Numbers refer to absolute sample size, percentages refer to the sample size after 
survey weights have been applied.
Table 3: Baseline and estimated change in alcohol consumption and spending with a £0·45 minimum 
unit price, by socioeconomic and consumption group
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Results
Table 2 shows the baseline data and policy appraisal 
results for the income quintile analysis. Baseline 
drinking prevalence and average drinking volume 
increased with increased income. Average weekly 
consumption in the highest income group was 38% 
higher than it was in the lowest income group, and 33% 
of the highest income group drank at hazardous or 
harmful levels compared with 16% for the lowest 
(table 2). A similar income gradient was present among 
moderate drinkers; however, this pattern reversed for 
harmful drinkers (table 2). Harmful drinkers on a low 
income consumed more alcohol than did their higher 
income counterparts.
Figure 1 shows the volume of alcohol sold at less than a 
£0·45 per unit threshold. Moderate drinkers p urchased a 
mean of 0·7 units per week at prices lower than the 
threshold, with hazardous drinkers purchasing 5·3 such 
units. By contrast, harmful drinkers purchased on 
average more than 30 times more units for less than 
£0·45 than did moderate drinkers. Furthermore, the 
amounts varied substantially by income, with harmful 
drinkers on the lowest incomes purchasing 30·8 units 
per week at less than the minimum unit price (40·6% of 
their alcohol) whereas harmful drinkers in the highest 
income group purchased 13·6 units at less than this 
price (20·3% of their purchases). Almost all (>99%) units 
bought for less than the minimum unit price were 
purchased in the oﬀ -trade (ie, supermarkets or shops) in 
each subgroup.
In our analysis, a £0·45 minimum unit price led to an 
overall estimated reduction in population alcohol 
consumption of −1·6% (−12 units per drinker per year; 
table 2, ﬁ gure 2). Substantial heterogeneity existed in the 
results between groups, with much larger reductions in 
harmful drinkers than in moderate or hazardous 
drinkers (table 2). Consumption in the lowest income 
group was estimated to decrease by more than 4% and 
smaller reductions were seen as incomes increased; 
especially in the upper two quintiles in which the 
decrease was estimated to be less than −1%. Consumption 
in harmful drinkers was estimated to decrease in all 
income groups with by far the largest decrease in 
individuals with the lowest incomes, although smaller 
decreases were also estimated for the highest income 
group (table 2). The estimated eﬀ ect on moderate 
drinkers was much smaller than it was for heavier 
drinkers with less variation across the income 
distribution (table 2). We noted much the same results in 
sensitivity analyses (ﬁ gure 2, appendix).
Most of the total reduction in consumption occurred 
within the 5·3% of the population who were harmful 
drinkers (74·0% of the total reduction), with the two 
lowest income quintiles contributing 66·7% of the 
overall total. Estimated policy eﬀ ects for consumer 
spending on alcohol were related to the estimated 
change in consumption, and also depend on the 
beverage preferences of each population subgroup and 
the own-price and cross-price elasticities associated 
with those beverages. Most changes in spending were 
modest in absolute terms and range from a reduction 
of almost £35 per year for harmful drinkers in the 
lowest income group (from a baseline of £2685) to an 
increase of £16·35 for harmful drinkers in the highest 
income group (from a baseline of £2751). Eﬀ ects on 
moderate drinkers were much smaller, with an annual 
increase in spending of £0·04 in the lowest income 
group compared with an increase of £1·86 in the 
highest income group.
Population Routine 
or manual
Intermediate Managerial 
or 
professional
Percentage of overall population* 10 588 
(100%)
4407 (42%) 1791 (17%) 4390 (42%)
Baseline health harms in year 10
Deaths 9730 5550 1560 2620 
Chronic illnesses (thousands) 309 162·5 54·8 92·0
Acute illnesses (thousands) 156 92·0 27·3 36·7
Hospital admissions (thousands) 763 413·3 133·9 215·7
QALYs (thousands) 925 552·7 159·7 213·3
Baseline cumulative discounted costs: years 1–10
Health-care costs (millions) £18 054 £10 436 £3182 £4436
QALY value (millions) £55 490 £33 164 £9585 £12 741
Total costs (millions) £73 544 £43 601 £12 766 £17 177
Annual changes in year 10
Deaths −860 −710 −70 −90
Reduction in deaths (%) −8·9% −12·7% −4·6% −3·3%
Chronic illnesses (thousands) −12·4 −10·5 −0·9 −1·0
Reduction in chronic illnesses (%) −4·0% −6·5% −1·6% −1·1%
Acute illnesses (thousands) −3·3 −3·2 −0·2 0·1
Reduction in acute illnesses (%) −2·1% −3·5% −0·7% 0·3%
Hospital admissions (thousands) −29·9 −25·7 −2·1 −2·1
Reduction in hospital admissions (%) −3·9% −6·2% −1·6% −1·0%
QALYs (thousands) −33·3 −29·0 −2·5 −1·8
Reduction in QALYs (%) −3·6% −5·2% −1·6% −0·8%
Share of reduction in deaths (%) 100·0% 81·8% 8·3% 9·9%
Share of reduction in chronic illnesses (%) 100·0% 84·8% 7·2% 8·0%
Share of reduction in acute illnesses (%) 100·0% 96·9% 6·1% −3·0%
Share of reduction in hospital admissions (%) 100·0% 86·0% 7·0% 7·0%
Share of reduction in total QALYs saved (%) 100·0% 87·1% 7·5% 5·4%
Cumulative discounted cost changes: years 1–10
Health-care costs (millions) –£561 –£494 –£40 –£27
Reduction in health-care costs (%) −3·1% −4·7% −1·3% −0·6%
QALY value (millions) –£1996 –£1737 –£150 –£108
QALY value (%) −3·6% −5·2% −1·6% −0·8%
Total cost savings (millions) –£2557 –£2232 –£190 –£135
Total cost savings (%) −3·5% −5·1% −1·5% −0·8%
Share of total costs saved (%) 100·0% 87·3% 7·4% 5·3%
QALY=quality-adjusted life-year. *Numbers refer to absolute sample size, percentages refer to the sample size after 
survey weights have been applied.
Table 4: Health harm reductions in year 10 with a £0·45 minimum unit price, by socioeconomic group 
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In our analysis split by socioeconomic groups, we 
noted more substantial reductions in consumption in 
routine or manual groups than in intermediate groups, 
which in turn had greater reductions than in managerial 
or professional groups (table 3). 10 years after 
implementation, a £0·45 minimum unit price was 
estimated to lead to substantive annual reductions in 
mortality and illness related to alcohol consumption 
(table 4). For each outcome measure, the relative 
reductions were at least twice as large for harms 
occurring in routine or manual worker households 
compared with intermediate, managerial, or professional 
households. Routine or manual worker households 
made up 41·7% of the population but accrued 
proportionately more of the harm reductions (>80% of 
reductions in deaths, hospital admissions, and quality-
adjusted life years lost; table 4). The overall 10-year 
reduction from a £0·45 minimum unit price in health-
care costs related to alcohol consumption and health-
related quality of life was estimated to be £2·6 billion.
The minimum unit price policy would primarily 
reduce alcohol consumption and reduce harm (in terms 
of mortality and lower quality of life) in harmful 
drinkers and individuals of lower socioeconomic status 
(ﬁ gure 3). The estimated reduction in mortality related 
to alcohol consumption in harmful drinkers was six-
times greater for individuals in routine or manual 
households than it was in individuals in managerial or 
professional households and the gain in quality-
adjusted life-years was ten-times greater (ﬁ gure 3). 
Because the reduction in consumption was only four-
times greater between these groups, this diﬀ erence 
suggests that reductions in consumption in harmful 
drinkers in the lowest socioeconomic groups result in 
greater harm reductions than in higher socioeconomic 
groups, especially for morbidity related to alcohol 
consumption.
Results of the sensitivity analyses are shown in the 
appendix. The pattern of results across population 
subgroups was consistent with our base-case analysis, 
despite variations in the size of eﬀ ects when diﬀ erent 
parameters or assumptions were applied.
Discussion
Our policy appraisals suggest that introduction of a 
£0·45 minimum unit price would have substantially 
diﬀ erent eﬀ ects across consumption, income, and 
socioeconomic groups. These diﬀ erences are driven by 
the alcohol consumption and purchasing patterns of 
population subgroups, the price elasticities of the 
diﬀ erent alcoholic beverages they purchase, and each 
group’s risk of harm related to alcohol consumption. 
Moderate drinkers, including those with low incomes, 
would be little aﬀ ected by the policy because they 
purchase only small quantities of alcohol at less than the 
proposed £0·45 minimum unit price threshold. Both 
non-drinking and moderate consumption are more 
prevalent in low income groups, meaning large 
proportions of these groups would not be substantially 
aﬀ ected by the policy. Eﬀ ects would be much more 
striking for harmful drinkers. The model estimates that 
harmful drinkers with the lowest incomes would reduce 
their consumption the most, while consumption in 
harmful drinkers with high incomes would also reduce. 
Notably, the estimated health beneﬁ ts from the policy are 
also unequally distributed among socioeconomic groups. 
Figure 3: Estimated consumption and harm changes for a £0·45 minimum unit price, by socioeconomic and 
consumption group
(A) Change in annual number of units consumed per drinker. (B) Change in number of deaths related to alcohol per 
100 000 drinkers in year 10. (C) Cumulative QALYs gained per 100 000 drinkers in years 1–10 (discounted). 
QALY=quality-adjusted life-year.
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Most health gains occur in harmful drinkers in the 
poorest routine or manual worker groups, suggesting 
that the policy could contribute substantially to the 
reduction of health inequalities.
Absolute spending changes in all subgroups were 
small, with most groups showing slight increases; 
however, small spending reductions were noted for some 
low-income groups. Spending reductions occur when 
drinkers purchase beverages with high own-price 
elasticities and predominantly negative cross-price 
elasticities, as is the case for low income drinkers (table 1, 
ﬁ gure 1). This ﬁ nding suggests that drinkers on a low 
income are less able to absorb price increases and their 
resultant behavioural changes (eg, switching between 
beverage types) lead to small overall reductions in 
spending across all products.
Our results provide the most comprehensive analysis 
to date of the equity implications of a minimum unit 
price and, in particular, provide to our knowledge the 
ﬁ rst estimates of how eﬀ ects on alcohol-related mortality 
and morbidity can vary by socioeconomic status (panel). 
Limitations include the indirect modelling of changes in 
highest daily consumption, which is important because 
occasions of heavy drinking might be less responsive to 
price changes,29 and not accounting for potential 
secondary policy eﬀ ects (eg, increased illicit alcohol 
trading or market restructuring). Data used for 
adjustment of baseline health risks by socioeconomic 
status were only available for overall mortality related to 
alcohol consumption rather than for individual 
conditions or for morbidity; thus, harm reductions might 
have been incorrectly apportioned across socioeconomic 
groups. Recent meta-analyses have noted diﬀ erent risk 
curves for mortality compared with morbidity; for 
example, in liver cirrhosis.30 Equivalent meta-analyses are 
not available for most of the 47 conditions modelled by 
SAPM, and for consistency we do not use separate 
mortality and morbidity risk functions for chronic 
conditions that are partly attributable to alcohol 
consumption. If new evidence shows equivalent patterns 
for other conditions, the model structure can incorporate 
these changes. Further research providing evidence 
speciﬁ c to each condition by socioeconomic group and 
separating mortality from morbidity would be beneﬁ cial. 
In general, SAPM’s base case uses conservative 
assumptions when faced with data limitations or 
uncertainty, and comparison of results for the Canadian 
adaptation of SAPM with assessments of minimum 
price changes in Canada suggests that the model might 
underestimate the eﬀ ects of minimum unit price.7,8,31 
Critiques of SAPM have been produced by consultants 
commissioned by the alcohol industry32,33 and a free-
market-oriented think tank.6 Their main arguments have 
been addressed in a detailed rebuttal.34
A key strength of SAPM is its provision of estimated 
policy eﬀ ects for several outcomes across several 
subgroups. Previous analyses of the equity implications 
of public health interventions related to price, such as 
alcohol or tobacco taxation, rarely account for changes in 
public health outcomes and are instead based on analyses 
of changes in spending or consumption.28,35 For example, 
the Institute for Fiscal Studies has argued that a 
minimum unit price is mildly regressive on the basis of 
analyses in which potential spending changes show 
small negative associations with income. SAPM’s more 
complex elasticity model suggests that a minimum unit 
price is mildly progressive on this measure; however, it 
also estimates large harm reductions for low 
socioeconomic groups, suggesting minimum unit price 
is a progressive policy in terms of reduction of health 
inequalities. Furthermore, although average 
consumption reductions would be greatest among 
drinkers with the lowest incomes, our ﬁ ndings concur 
Panel: Research in context
Systematic review
We searched PubMed and Google Scholar up to July, 2013, for reports published in English 
and contacted experts to identify reports detailing eﬀ ects related to income groups in 
alcohol pricing policy. Search terms included income, socioeconomic, poor, poverty, or 
disadvantage and alcohol, pricing, or policy. We prioritised policy appraisal and evaluation 
studies. Analyses of alcohol-demand elasticities generally show greater price elasticities for 
lower income groups than for high-income ones.27 More detailed analyses of the equity 
implications of interventions for alcohol pricing were provided in three studies, but these 
reports were restricted to considerations of alcohol purchasing and consumption as 
outcomes. An analysis13 of purchasing patterns of alcohol with data from 2 week spending 
diaries in Scotland reported that the predicted proportion of households purchasing alcohol 
at less than the minimum unit price and the predicted quantity of such purchases were 
higher for harmful drinkers than they were for moderate drinkers. Moreover, within each 
consumption group, a modest income gradient was reported with the lowest income 
groups most likely to purchase alcohol at less than the minimum unit price. A second study12 
estimated changes in alcohol spending on the basis of a uniform price elasticity of −0·5 for all 
products (ie, a 1% increase in prices would lead to a 0·5% fall in consumption) and analysis of 
patterns in alcohol purchasing from British continuous spending diaries (ranging from 84 
days to 1 year). The study concluded that a minimum unit price would be mildly regressive 
because estimated percentage increases in grocery spending were negatively associated with 
income. Daley and colleagues28 estimated increases in alcohol duty paid per head for a 
hypothetical $0·25-per-drink tax increase with a US consumption survey and a uniform price 
elasticity of −0·51 for all alcohol products. The group reported that increases in duty paid 
were associated positively with income for low-risk drinkers but negatively associated with 
income for high-risk drinkers. No empirical studies were identiﬁ ed that examined diﬀ erential 
eﬀ ects of alcohol price policies on health outcomes by income group.
Interpretation
Our ﬁ ndings are not directly comparable with previous studies because our detailed analyses 
consider drinkers’ preferences for diﬀ erent products and purchasing locations and changes 
to these preferences after price changes. We also examine a wider range of outcome 
measures (alcohol consumption, spending, and multiple health harm measures) and provide 
analyses for both income and socioeconomic status. Dependent on the outcome in 
question, we estimate that a minimum unit price has both progressive (spending and health 
harms) and regressive (consumption) eﬀ ects and these need to be balanced in any judgment 
of the equity implications of the policy. However, our ﬁ ndings are in line with the previous 
evidence that eﬀ ects on moderate drinkers are small and the substantive eﬀ ects of the policy 
are restricted to individuals drinking at high rates for all income groups.
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with Ludbrook and colleagues,13 who suggest that these 
diﬀ erences are only substantive for individuals 
consuming large quantities of alcohol and note that 
fewer heavy drinkers are in low-income groups than in 
high-income groups. If, as argued by some 
commentators,35 reductions in consumption itself 
induced by policy are negative eﬀ ects, then our results 
suggest a minimum unit price has a mixture of regressive 
(consumption) and progressive (health outcomes) 
eﬀ ects. This mixture of eﬀ ects provides no support for 
the UK Government’s concerns about the eﬀ ect of a 
minimum unit price on responsible drinkers and 
suggests that claims of the policy being regressive need 
substantial qualiﬁ cation.
Overall, moderate drinkers, irrespective of income, 
would only be aﬀ ected marginally by a minimum unit 
price policy. The policy would mainly aﬀ ect harmful 
drinkers. Moreover, because harmful drinkers on low 
incomes purchase most alcohol at less than the 
minimum unit price, this group would be more aﬀ ected 
than would individuals on higher incomes. Policy makers 
need to balance large reductions in consumption by 
harmful drinkers on a low income against the greater 
health gains that could be made in this group from 
reduced morbidity and mortality related to alcohol 
consumption.
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